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Originalism is not about the text. On a conventional but mistaken view, to
be an originalist is to read words in a particular way—to take a particular approach to divining the meaning of the Constitution’s language. It might be a
good approach to meaning or a bad one; it might look to the Framers or the
Ratiﬁers, to lawyers or the general public; but meaning itself is always the goal.
The question the theory addresses is “what does the text of the Constitution
mean?”; the answer originalism offers is “whatever it originally meant.” Or, as
notably summarized by Lawrence Solum, originalism today is united by two
“core ideas”1:
(1) The Fixation Thesis: that “[t]he meaning of the constitutional text is
ﬁxed when each provision is framed and ratiﬁed.”2
(2)The Constraint Principle: that this “original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice.”3
These core ideas lie at the heart of the “New Originalism,” the movement’s
dominant school.4 They’re recognized as authoritative by both supporters and
opponents.5 Yet the core ideas serve better as a summary than a deﬁnition; using them to circumscribe the theory is a mistake. That’s because originalism
doesn’t need to be about the meaning of any text. A society can be recognizably
originalist without having a written constitution, written law, or any writing at
all. If having a text isn’t fundamental to originalism, then originalism isn’t fundamentally about the meaning of texts. We could exclude such a society by
stipulation if we wished,6 but that would save the core ideas only by sacriﬁcing
the coherence of the theory they describe.
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
Id. at 1; see also id. at 15 (stating the “fully elaborated version” of the Fixation Thesis as holding that “[t]he object of constitutional interpretation is the communicative content of the
constitutional text, and that content was ﬁxed when each provision was framed and/or ratiﬁed”).
Id. at 1.
See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 607-12 (2004).
Compare, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641, 647 & n.12 (2013), Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 & n.2 (2011), and Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional
Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1864 & n.104, 1865 (2013), with, e.g.,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2015), James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 1786-87 (2013), and Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the
Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 974 (2015).
See generally Solum, supra note 1, at 6 n.28 (citing sources).
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 1, at 7 n.28.
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In our society, of course, we do have a written Constitution, and debates
about its meaning ﬁgure centrally in our constitutional law. Even so, these linguistic debates should be kept in their place. Treating the core ideas as ﬁrm requirements would exclude, without justiﬁcation, a variety of theories more coherently brought within the originalist tent. A number of scholars, this author
among them, have argued for shifting focus from original meaning to our original law: the law of the United States as it stood at the Founding, and as it’s
been lawfully amended since.7 That law might well have been shaped in part by
the original meaning of legal texts—so that the Constitution’s meaning would
indeed have been ﬁxed at the Founding, and this ﬁxed meaning would indeed
constrain constitutional practice. The core ideas would then be contingent consequences, but not necessary features, of a broader commitment to originalism.
Other scholars look to still different facts about the Founders—such as the values they expressed, the particular policies they endorsed, or the interpretive
methods they employed.8
All of these theories have something in common. They treat the content of
American constitutional law as properly resting on its origins—on features of
our legal Founding that remain legally operative today. Accepting them means
treating modern law as vulnerable to history, as open to refutation by claims
about the past. But each theory looks to different features of the Founding, and
each might occasionally conﬂict with a view centered on the original meaning
of language. Given the strong attachments or aversions people have to the
“originalist” label, it’d be nice to know how broadly it applies. Perhaps theories
like these really ought to be cast out of originalism, into outer darkness, where

7.

8.
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See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817,
844-45 (2015); see also, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
2349, 2355 n.16 (2015) (endorsing this view); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 99 (2016) (same, but for different reasons); cf. Chris
Green, Posner and Segall’s Evasion of the Sense-Reference Distinction, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec.
9, 2016, 10:55 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2016/12
/posner-segall-sense-and-reference.html [http://perma.cc/N25D-3DQY] (adopting this
view as a form of “meta-originalism”).
See, e.g., Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1161 (2013) (old-style original intentions); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1971) (original value choices); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (original methods);
Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting Originalism Back on Track, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/meanings-or-decisions
-getting-originalism-back-on-track [http://perma.cc/YT7U-6W46] (original policy decisions); cf. Solum, supra note 1, at 7 n.28 (noting the potential conﬂict between original
meaning and original methods).

originalism without text

there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. But that kind of move requires
argument, not just stipulation.
i
Consider the following hypothetical:
The society of Freedonia has no writing and no written law. Its legal
rules are passed down through oral traditions, which provide for councils of elders to do limited judicial work. Freedonia goes through a period of legal tumult, in which inﬂuential council decisions are said to
have misstated the traditional rules and to have exceeded the councils’
authority. A Great Council is held, in which it’s agreed—in substance,
and without resolving on any canonical form of words—that all innovations to date are to be accepted as necessary evils, but that no new innovations are to be allowed, and that the ancestral traditions are otherwise
to be preserved inviolate. Generations pass, and again some councils
begin to overstep these limits, arguing that the traditions must be altered to accommodate modern circumstances. Other Freedonian elders
criticize their fellows for failing to apply the law as approved at the
Great Council.
Are these critics originalists?
True, they aren’t trying to construe a constitutional text. Without a paper
record, it might be hard to know what the older traditions were, or to be sure
that they differed from those of the present day. But it’s a question of empirics,
not of theory, how much anyone knows about the past. Maybe the elders
learned the traditions in their youth, or consulted people who did; maybe they
reviewed audiotapes of oral histories helpfully recorded by visiting anthropologists. The nature of the evidence doesn’t matter. The older rules themselves
were real, the modern divergence from them may well be real, and the elders’
criticism of that divergence strikes a familiar originalist tone.
True also, the elders aren’t trying to enforce a written law. A society can
have “written law” without writing, of course; it can transmit an enacted text
by word of mouth just as it can on paper. The Constitution would still be
“written law” if it were recorded as a string of ones and zeros in ASCII format,
or as a set of interpretive dance steps—or if we all just memorized it, taught it
to our children, and then burned the National Archives. It would still contain
particular terms, adopted on a particular occasion, that carry legal signiﬁcance
by virtue of their adoption. Yet a society doesn’t have to structure its law this
way. In our hypothetical, the Council approved no canonical formulation of its
decision (say, “NO NEW INNOVATIONS ALLOWED”) that might serve as a text
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to be interpreted later. Maybe the Council ran more as a discussion session than
a legislative assembly, breaking up once a consensus emerged. Or maybe everyone simply understood what was agreed upon, reporting it back to friends and
colleagues in variously worded but substantively consistent ways.
The case would be no different had the Council proceedings been fully recorded. Maybe some unofficial reporters sat in and composed famous sagas
about the deliberations; these sagas would be texts, and they might even be
written down (the anthropologists again), providing full accounts of the proceedings. But like the yearbooks in medieval England, these accounts would be
mere evidence of the underlying legal standards: they would be written texts,
but not written law.9 A society can do plenty of writing about legal rules that
stay “unwritten”; it can describe its customary traditions in academic treatises,
formularies, case reports, and so on, while the traditions themselves remain
purely customary. What makes them so, as Blackstone put it, is that “their original institution and authority are not set down in writing, as acts of parliament
are,” but they instead “receive their binding power, and the force of laws,”
simply by usage and reception.10
Other customary traditions work the same way. Plenty of books describe
the rules of English grammar, and some of them—like Strunk & White11—
occasionally carry enough authority to inﬂuence the practice. But none of these
books can establish rules of grammar the way that statute books establish rules of
law.12 Individual statements about grammar and spelling might be more or less
accurate (“I before E, except after C,” “never end a sentence with a preposition,”
and so on), yet the particular form of words used to express the rules has no
independent signiﬁcance. What matters is whether our formulations get the
substance of our practice right.
So the Freedonian elders aren’t seeking to enforce a particular legal text,
whether transmitted by paper or by word of mouth. They seek only to enforce
the Council’s mandate. In other words, they wish to recover a norm that was
adopted, a decision that was made—not the meaning of some particular piece of
language, which was merely the “faint and distant echo”13 of these things and
which not everyone agreed on anyway.
9.

Cf. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 179-81 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the yearbooks as a mixture of unofficial case reports and student lecture notes).
10. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64.
11. WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (3d ed. 1979).
12. See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1797, 1800-01 (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012)).
13. S.E. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon’s Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202, 203 (1936), reprinted in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 155, 156 (1985).
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On the core-ideas account, then, the elders are excluded by stipulation from
the domain of originalists. The law in Freedonia is indifferent to the Fixation
Thesis. The meaning of a text might generally be ﬁxed at the time of its creation, or it might not; Freedonian law doesn’t rely on any particular text, so it’ll
be the same no matter what. And without such a text, there’s no ﬁxed meaning
which ought, per the Constraint Principle, to constrain Freedonian constitutional practice.
At the same time, though, we can perfectly well understand the critics as
leveling an ordinary originalist critique. They’re trying to recover the content of
the law as it stood at a speciﬁc point in history, because they believe that this
antique law determines the law as it stands today. And they criticize their fellow
officials, those who wish to modernize their society’s rules, for failing to adhere
to binding rules inherited from the past—rules in place at the time of the Great
Council, the founding moment of the Freedonian legal system.
To anyone conversant with the last several decades of originalism debates,
the Freedonian arguments should sound familiar. The elders’ effort to recover
old customs looks an awful lot like modern originalists digging up Founding
Era law on removal of officers, stare decisis, or sovereign immunity.14 These
originalists aren’t merely ﬁguring out what certain writings communicated at
some point in the past (such as by consulting a dictionary or a linguistic corpus);15 they’re using those writings to determine what the law was back then,
with all its various exceptions, augmentations, and epicycles included.16 They
look not only for “the statements found in the texts of constitutions,”17 as John
Finnis puts it, nor even for the aspects of historical context that might enrich
those statements’ meaning,18 but for “the propositions which are true, as a matter of law,” in virtue of the written statements and context along with other legal rules extant at the time.19 If you wanted to know whether a foreign murder
statute applies to cases of duress, you wouldn’t learn much from how the society uses words like “every,” “person,” “who,” or “kills,” or the entire phrase in
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See, e.g., Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern Textualism and
State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135, 1165-77 (2009); Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001); Saikrishna Prakash,
New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2006).
See, e.g., James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool To
Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016).
See, e.g., Brief of Originalist Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14-18,
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12-1281).
4 JOHN FINNIS, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 1, 18 (2011).
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111,
1129-32 (2015).
FINNIS, supra note 17, at 18.
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context; you’d need to learn more about their legal system as a whole.20 (And
determining which documents count as “the text” may itself require extensive
legal reasoning, often involving doctrines of unwritten law.21) How language
was used may be a crucial input, but as William Baude and I have argued, “law
begins and ends the inquiry.”22
This is far from the only way to be an originalist. But it surely shouldn’t be
excluded at the outset. And given how much the research and arguments of the
Freedonian elders resemble those of American originalists, assigning them
some other label (like “foundationalist,” or “schmoriginalist,” or whatever)
would seem to distort more than it clariﬁes.
ii
Solum’s work suggests a potential response. Perhaps the Freedonians really
do rely on ﬁxation after all. To the extent that they take account of the traditions as they stood at the Great Council, they merely ﬁx the traditions instead,
taking these ﬁxed traditions to constrain future constitutional practice.23
This argument is insightful, but it doesn’t quite work. It’s true that any
plausible approach to originalism hangs its hat on something ﬁxed at a crucial
moment in the past; there’s no “originalism” without something “original” to
look back to. But the Fixation Thesis, by its terms, “is not a claim about the ﬁxation of constitutional doctrine.”24 That’s a matter for the Constraint Principle.
And if the Fixation Thesis were about doctrine, it wouldn’t be supported by the
affirmative case Solum makes for it; his arguments rest on general propositions
in the philosophy of language,25 which has nothing to say, at least not directly,
about the content of any one society’s law.26 Whatever the correct analysis of
the meaning of texts in general (public meaning, speaker’s meaning, whatev20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079,
1105-07 (2017).
See, e.g., John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
375, 378-80 (2001).
Baude & Sachs, supra note 20, at 1083.
See Solum, supra note 1, at 29 n.87 (describing original-methods originalism as ﬁxing methods, not communicative content).
Id. at 15; see also id. at 32, 34-35.
See id. at 20-29.
See Baude & Sachs, supra note 20, at 1089-92; see also Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 233 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds.,
2011) (noting that “[p]hilosophy of language and Gricean theory have nothing to say about
what we should deem to be the content of the legislature’s intentions”).
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er), the Freedonian legal system might obstinately persist in giving legal effect
to something else. Or it might refuse to adopt any authoritative linguistic formulations—favoring oral traditions that might, as Brian Simpson wrote of res
ipsa loquitur, be expressed in six different ways by six different legal scholars.27
The original traditions might still be law for modern Freedonia, or they might
not, but the truth of the Fixation Thesis as applied to particular texts won’t
affect them one way or the other.
A second response might be that Freedonia indeed ﬁxes, not the meaning
of a single communication, but that of many communications at once. Whatever the Council decided, other people had to ﬁnd out somehow. What actually
constrains legal behavior in Freedonia isn’t what Council members said to each
other, but the reports that came back to everyone else—and we can’t sensibly
consult these reports without treating their meaning as ﬁxed.
This response does invoke a version of both ﬁxation and constraint. Yet it
isn’t quite the same version as that of the core ideas. It dispenses with the idea
of a binding legal text (an idea central to the Constraint Principle) in favor of a
panoply of Council-member statements which themselves lack any formal status as law. This response may ﬁt better with Larry Alexander’s view of originalism as “authority-preserving”28: short of directly reading the Council members’
minds,29 ﬁxing the meaning of their communications to others might be the
next best way to respect their unique lawmaking authority over time. Even authority-preservingness, though, may demand more than we need for originalism. The point of having the authority was to produce some norms for others to
follow. And a legal system can preserve those norms without needing to preserve the authority that produced them. (Suppose that Schmeedonia is exactly
like Freedonia—except that instead of a Great Council, it held a months-long
“National Conversation on Custom,” reaching precisely the same result in the
end. Here there’s no obvious relationship of authority-and-subject,30 but do the
Schmeedonians have any worse claim to being originalists?)
A third response might be that the Fixation Thesis is still true in Freedonia;
it’s a philosophical claim about how language works, and it should be equally
true in all times and places. Instead, we should grasp the nettle and declare
Freedonia a nonoriginalist society, because it rejects the Constraint Principle’s
27.

A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY:
ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359, 371 (1987).
28. Larry Alexander, Aggregating States of Mind: A Response to Fallon 5 (Univ. of San Diego Sch.
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-258, 2017), http://ssrn.com/id=2916864
[http://perma.cc/B272-GGTA].
29. See generally Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010).
30. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 75 (3d ed. 2012) (noting the difficulty of “saying that
here the ‘bulk’ of the society habitually obey themselves”).
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requirement of a written text. After all, the modern scholars who rank customary principles over constitutional text often describe themselves as ﬁrm opponents of originalism.31
But the Freedonians don’t describe themselves that way, and we shouldn’t
either. Their attention to custom is crucially determined by the past, not just by
the present. They look to a certain set of customs only because, as a matter of
historical fact, those were the customs the Council entrenched. If some Freedonians wanted to replace their unwritten customs with a ﬁxed text, they’d ﬁnd
themselves—in typical originalist fashion—to be unhappily constrained by the
past, facing legal barriers imposed by their continued adherence to an original
customary law.
In this respect, the Freedonian critics couldn’t differ more from those who
treat our Founding Era written law as having since been supplanted by a
“common law approach to the Constitution.”32 Whether Freedonia’s rules allow
for change depends on their original customs, not current opinion. Our own
Constitution called for different rules before and after the year 1808,33 but no
one sees that as a blow to originalism. Maybe Freedonia’s customs called for lots
of change, to be determined by drifting patterns of language use or the meandering preferences of judges; that might seem as nonoriginalist as it gets.34 But
so would the core-ideas account, as applied to a written constitution with an
Evolving Meanings Clause (say, commanding that the text be read “according
to the latest trends and judicial whimsies”). Respecting the original meaning of
this provision would mean disregarding the original meaning of everything
else. We might think that’s a silly way to run a legal system; James Madison
thought so, too.35 Yet the search for original meaning, just like the search for
original custom, is no more or less originalist depending on what it happens to
ﬁnd. Unless it abandons method for substance, all a theory can promise is that
it will look in the right place.
Given Freedonia’s respect for binding original constraints, whatever they
might be, why deny it the “originalist” label? Why focus on compliance with a
writing-focused Constraint Principle? Not all law is written law, and not every
society needs to rely on it in the same way. Insisting on the original communi-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
Id. at 5.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
See Solum, supra note 1, at 62-63 (describing such a view as a “rival of originalism”).
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 190, 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“What a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern
sense!”).
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cative content of a speciﬁc constitutional text would be like insisting that the
yearbooks be treated as modern official reporters; we could be reading the text
correctly while utterly misunderstanding the legal role it was to play. Restricting originalism to societies with written constitutions would be no less arbitrary than expecting all societies to have them.
iii
All deﬁnitions are arbitrary in some sense. As a stipulated term, we can deﬁne “originalism” however we like. If the core-ideas account matches general
practice, and especially if it pays its way by usefully distinguishing different
phenomena, then there’s no point ﬁghting over labels. As Solum puts it, an
effort to include other theories within the tent is “a move in a metalinguistic
negotiation over ‘originalism,’” an argument over how best to use “the word
and associated concept.”36 So long as we’re careful about our terms, and clear
about which theories we have in mind, maybe Solum is right that “nothing
substantive hangs on [the] point.”37
But this doesn’t mean the argument is empty. For one thing, the core-ideas
formulation is also a move in a metalinguistic negotiation, one that may or may
not capture the current linguistic practice or a useful family resemblance
among concepts. Fights over words are often really ﬁghts over the nature of the
world the words describe. To borrow examples from David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell, when we dispute whether Secretariat was an “athlete,” or whether
waterboarding is “torture,” we’re not just speculating about how other English
speakers use words, but arguing about something real: how to place ideas in a
preexisting web of connotations and connections, “how to carve up the world
with the concepts we employ.”38 Stipulating artiﬁcial terms (like “torture-A”
and “torture-B”) might clarify academic discussions, but it wouldn’t tell us
what we really want to know: whether the notions we often associate with “torture,” full stop, are properly associated here, too.
The same goes for “originalism.” As Solum has correctly noted, “Originalism is not a natural kind”;39 even our best summary of this broad family of
theories might not carve nature at the joints. Still, we might understand these

36.

Solum, supra note 1, at 7 n.28.
Id.
38. David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell, Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes, 19 LEGAL THEORY 242, 263-65 (2013).
39. Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory,
in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 32
(Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
37.
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theories better if we could discuss them in an orderly and systematic way. All
else equal, our choices to deploy or withhold “originalism” ought to respond to
both usage and theory: to common intuitions and ways of invoking the label,
and to a coherent account (or sympathetic reconstruction) of what the people
we generally recognize as “originalists” generally assert.40 When we argue for a
particular view, particularism is ﬁne; some individual version might claim the
mantle of originalism as the “best understanding” of them all.41 But when we
address the ﬁeld as a whole, both usage and theory should nudge us toward a
bigger tent.
As to usage, the broad agreement that text is centrally important to
originalism can be explained by the fact that, in our society and with our history, the text is centrally important. That this importance is contingent doesn’t
make it less true. Contingency does, however, explain why many scholars have
failed to pay attention to cases in which originalism is practiced quite differently—to cases, for example, in which important parts of our original law were
unwritten.42 Think, again, of what are widely understood to be originalist arguments about the removal power, stare decisis, or sovereign immunity.43
These doctrines are a source of vague embarrassment for an originalism centered on speciﬁc constitutional phrases; the Eleventh Amendment really
doesn’t say everything the Court said in Alden v. Maine.44 Yet Alden might still
be right, and on wholly originalist grounds.45 If originalism draws on the
Founders’ legal rules as well as their language, then no embarrassment is necessary; this is the ordinary work of originalist scholarship, not some unusual
exception. Or think of the “original intent” scholars for whom Paul Brest
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
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Cf. David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro, Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence
as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry, 127 ETHICS (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2964089 [http://perma.cc/8KDN-TVM4] (noting that the authors “do not aim to capture the full range of ways that [a particular] term . . . is used,” but
rather “to pick out a theoretically interesting and uniﬁed philosophical project, which, at the
same time, draws on key strands of existing usage of the term”).
See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 7, at 864; cf. id. at 819 (“Not everyone agrees with this picture, of
course; not even all ‘originalists.’”).
See Baude & Sachs, supra note 20, at 1137-38; Sachs, supra note 7, at 849-52.
See sources cited supra note 14.
527 U.S. 706 (1999). Compare id. (forbidding Congress from authorizing suits against states
in state court), with U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limiting such suits in federal court), and John
F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE
L.J. 1663, 1726-27 (2004) (noting the difference). See generally Alden, 527 U.S. at 729 (stating
that “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
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originalism without text

coined the term,46 who highlight what the Founders intended to achieve,
whether or not those substantive intentions were successfully encoded in the
meaning of text.47 This project may have its ﬂaws,48 but it may also be what
most Americans assume “originalism” is about49—and any deﬁnition excluding
it is far too narrow.
As to theory, in offering a coherent account of the ﬁeld, we should focus on
what makes originalism distinctive, considering the questions it addresses as
well as the answers it offers. What’s unique about originalism isn’t necessarily
an approach to reading; originalists read historical documents in pretty much
the same ways that other people do.50 Instead, as sophisticated nonoriginalists
have noticed, originalism as a category of legal theory makes distinctive claims
about our society’s law.51 And the crucial feature of those legal claims, the most
comprehensive and useful description one could give them, is that they render
the law in some sense vulnerable to original facts—facts about a founding moment of overriding legal signiﬁcance, with the capacity to upset any subsequent
innovations. That “what you wish cannot be done, for so it was laid down in
the time of the Great Council” is perhaps the paradigmatic originalist move;
and it can be made just as well in Freedonia as in the United States.
iv
To summarize: if the Freedonian critics really are originalists, then originalism isn’t fully described by the two “core ideas.” General claims about the
communicative content of texts are practically important but inessential to
originalism, because we can have originalism without any authoritative text to
analyze. Any past decision, including the resolution of a Great Council, could
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have been expressed in many different formulations, so long as the ultimate legal proposition was the same—much the way that “9 + 3” and “7 + 5” refer to the
same thing by different means. And preserving legal propositions, as opposed
to the meanings of words, is often what originalists care about most. (If we’re
not going to preserve the propositions the Constitution enacted, then there’s
not much importance to ﬁxing the meaning of its words; and if we are going to
preserve the propositions, then the meanings will usually come along for the
ride.)
Freedonia is just a hypothetical, and it’s also a special case. In the real
world, where literacy is widespread and ink is plentiful, we tend to write these
things down: “[t]he powers of the legislature are deﬁned and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”52 In
our system, originalism makes good use of the advantages of written language.53 But the two don’t always go together. As Andrew Coan has argued, a
society might use written legal instruments without using them in a particularly originalist way.54 And the converse is also true: you can have a bona ﬁde
originalism in a society that uses no written instruments at all. Which of the
two, if either, appears in a given society is a matter of empirics, not of deﬁnition. If that’s right, then much of the constitutional theory of the past few decades—theory that’s placed crucial weight on concepts of writtenness—might
need to be rewritten.
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